The War on Terror, Taiwan, and President Ma (Part 1)

Thursday, June 12, 2008

The War on Terror, Taiwan, and President Ma (Part 1)

One of the most bittersweet truisms vis-a-vis the world order we strive to better is the way that our interactions ripple throughout the system, catalyzing any number of reactions, both foreseen and unforeseen, intended and unintended. The results of one people's actions run the gamut from serendipitous to catastrophic. Revolutions spill not only across borders but into the minds of people much further afield, in time or space, and an economic downturn in one country may give spark or momentum, by virtue of the vacuum it creates, to a scientific and cultural renaissance on another continent.

In previous centuries, when people and news moved at a horse's gallop and the only satellite that orbited the earth was giant hunk of rock, we rarely -- if ever -- trifled ourselves with the foreign consequences that may arise from our local affairs. Yet, now that, for example, a person may avenge or acknowledge you personally within a day's travel from anywhere in the world for what you may not even know you've done to or for him, the luxury of our ignorance is no longer.

We are becoming acutely aware of the various results of our actions. Pollution in China is seen in a new light when – as the New York Times reported in 2006 and again in 2008 – researchers in California, Oregon and Washington track a cloud of particulate from coal mines in China as it traverses Korea and the Pacific Ocean to settle in unprecedented quantities on filters in Lake Tahoe, California. Pollution in China, at once, becomes pollution from China, and the prospect of the particulate lodging in the tissue of my lungs gives it a wholly new sense of urgency. Likewise, the failings of a government in eastern Africa are no longer a remote or distinct problem once we consider the facility with which those who harbor ill-will towards us can slip in and out, often endearing themselves to the people of the country, with money and false hope, filling a void left by the broken government.

Likewise, then, the atrocities of September 11 were no different. They were the product of numerous actions and reactions and would themselves be a factor in many more. Rarely, though does the scope of our present conflict ever look beyond the binary of the West and the Middle East.

I, too, gave very little thought to this prospect until I attended a breakfast meeting in December, at which several other Taiwan bloggers were present, to hear a former White House policy analyst talk about his experiences in epicenter of American politics.

At one point, he mentioned the tension in the White House when, if I remember correctly, President Chen made "provocative" comments about his support for a referendum on Taiwanese independence in 2002.

“Simply put," said Chen in a speech Chen gave via video-link to Taiwanese nationals in Japan, "with Taiwan and China on each side of the [Taiwan] Strait, each side is a country. This needs to be clear..”

Having been bolstered, first, by the Bush Administration's view that the US had been neither tough enough on China nor attentive enough to the concerns of the Taiwanese government and, second, by the loss of diplomatic recognition by Nauru to China, Chen declared that Taiwan would “go its own way.”

This, to put it lightly, did not fly with Beijing, and it couldn't have come at a worse time for the United States. While the Bush Administration had indeed come into office looking to strengthen ties with Taiwan and to hold the Chinese government's feet to the fire, the game had quickly changed when the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were attacked and the nation took to mounting its war on terror. By August of 2002, the US was already fighting in Afghanistan and months into the planning for the following spring's invasion* of Iraq.

Apparently, upon being informed of Chen's remarks someone in the Bush Administration asked in frustration if Chen knew what he was doing. Did Chen know how inopportune a moment he had chosen to ruffle China's feathers?

The answer of course was, no, probably not. Chen didn't know how bad a moment this was for the United States because the United States didn't talk to him.

It was hearing our breakfast guest talk about this, specifically in the context of 9-11 and Iraq, that the attacks' profound effect on Taiwanese democratization became apparent to me. Nevertheless, what was to happen with Taiwan would be one in a series of reminders that the “crusade” against al-Qaeda would not be carried out in isolation, that history had a way of resurrecting itself no matter how deep we buried it, and that adding cold water to the cauldron without extinguishing the fire only delayed the inevitability of boiling water.

The US – either explicitly, or through the habit it developed – would try to do the latter with Taiwan and China. As we focused more manpower and resources on the wars in Afghanistan and later in Iraq, we tried frantically to assuage anyone else who so inconvenienced us as to continue with their own affairs knowing full well that their doing so was not in the best interests of the United States.

This was particularly detrimental to Taiwan, whose democracy was still only in it's sixth year and showing the glaring symptoms of its imperfection. Still, as the pressure grew in the Taiwan Strait, so did the possibility of confrontation, and the US chose to pour more water in the pot.

I don't intend to place the blame for Taiwan's democratic stagnation on American foreign policy, nor do I mean to insinuate that the KMT's recent win signifies a step backward per se. I do, however, wish to acknowledge that the US decision to placate the PRC to the detriment and isolation of the Chen Administration certainly played a significant role in pushing Chen to adopt the "diehard" stances he was later seen as embodying. There is little doubt that things could have been considerably different in Taiwan had the US not all but forgotten it in the turmoil of the last six years, shifting from a policy of political support to constant damage control.

This is not an argument for outright support of Taiwanese independence for the purpose of spiting the PRC. It is a plea for the United States, as long as it deems it necessary to participate in Taiwan-China relations, to take a just and realistic approach to dealing with the two sides. Demanding both sides show mutual respect to each other and to the rules, however ambiguous, that were put in place to frame the debate.

It's all fine and good to remind Taiwan that moves towards de jure independence are changes in the status quo, but only if you're equally mindful of the changes taking place when only one side of the Strait is threatening to invade the other.

Yet, the changes in the United states policy we saw after 9-11 often meant doing quite the opposite and siding with China on issue after issue, not due to any common interests, but for sustenance of a requisite calm in the region. We knew Taiwan had no designs on invading China, while the growing number of missiles pointed at the island said otherwise of the lengths to which China was willing to go.

Alas, it was only Taiwan who had changed the status quo. Blame and provocation were aspersions cast only on the Chen administration.

This argument, of course, would be vehemently refused by the PRC, saying the it was right to silence Chen, separatist that he was. Ironically, though, the US' handling of the situation should be met with indignity in China, being that the impetus for such actions by the US could easily lead one to believe that the American government simply doesn't see China as the mature player that it now sees itself to be. The US, essentially, is cooperating with China on Taiwan because it sees China as irrational and impetuous. China is a "Ming Vase," as Michael Turton put it recently, that must be coddled and mollified, lest it shatter.

What exactly the US gets out of this is very little, as it doesn't even necessarily guarantee that China won't attack Taiwan (as unlikely as I find such a proposition to be). In fact, one of the PRC's most stalwart supporters, France, as Turton also noted, can't even secure the promise that it won't be on the receiving end of economic abuse as a result of Chinese nationalism.

I've noted before France's seemingly unquestioning support of China, and I do think there is an important lesson to be learned from the results of France's actions:

One could hardly name a nation that has supported China more strongly, calling repeatedly for an end to the weapons embargo imposed after Tiananmen [ORIT: though already allegedly selling weapons to China despite said embargo] and touting its special relationship with China. It was French recognition of the PRC in 1964 that triggered the avalanche of recognition culminating in Nixon's visit and UN entry. And what does France get for its service to the Dragon Throne? A couple of protests and BAM! you have hurt the feelings of the Chinese people! Maybe the US ought to try this approach next time some Parisian criticizes McDonalds, instead of treating France like a friend and ally with whom we sometimes have differences.**

Some of you might think: See? If we be nice to China, we won't be boycotted. But that is exactly the kind of blackmail that China wants westerners to submit to: the cringing submission of the abused wife who hopes that if she is just works harder to make her husband happy, he won't smack her around, whereas the reality is that he smacks her because she abases herself before him. Shameful that Ambassador Randt [ORIT: here] has argued that the US ought to make submission to this kind of emotional blackmail US policy. There may be reasonable positions to take against selling F-16s to the US, but "the feelings of the Chinese people" are not among them.

It's worthing noting, aside from the footnote at the bottom of this post, the marked facility around the world in protesting French actions. While there were protests in London and the relay had to moved to a secret location in San Francisco for security concerns, the Chinese seem to have focused their resentment on la République. Likewise, the French certainly weren't the only ones to protest the US move to invade Iraq, but they quickly became more or less the sole addressee of American disdain.

Michael has a point, though.

The US needs to take new look at its policy towards China and Taiwan (this is where Ma comes in) and start challenging China to act like its a mature power, which would start with stronger demands for the dismantling of the nearly 1000+ missiles ready to lob across the Strait.

Of course, the Bush Administration has done so much to soil the US reputation that this is going to be a lot harder than it might otherwise have been. After all, how is the administration responsible for Iraq supposed to suggest what other countries should and shouldn't do militarily?

* but not for the subsequent insurgency.

** Yeah, I know what you're thinking: Remember those idiotic protests against France in the US when they wouldn't support a war that is now almost universally viewed as a colossal mistake? Remember pouring out wine in the streets? Remember "freedom fries"?

Yes, and I'm not going to defend that. Yet, I do think there is a considerable difference between protesting what was, at the time, seen as not backing the fight against the people who killed three thousand Americans and protesting against someone for les manifestations against your Olympic torch run.

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