NOTE: As usual, I feel it necessary to emphasize that China is not the root of all evil, and I know that. This article does not argue that. I cannot stress enough how welcome your comments are on this subject.


In polls of how Taiwanese people view unification with China, there are two results that time and again are acceptable to large slices of the population: either immediate independence or a "wait and see" approach that favors the "status quo" -- that pesky term that comes from the Latin for "sweet nothings" and whose definition requires GPS and a calendar to be understood in any given context.

The "wait and see" position takes into account the possibility of the general quality of life in China improving to a point that unification would favorable. As far as immediate independence is concerned, the implications are pretty obvious. Declaring independence means possibly incurring the wrath of the angry step-father next door, going to war, and watching its economy deflate. Of course, it doesn't really matter that the People's Republic of China has never actually controlled Taiwan or that Taiwanese people have an overall negative view of China; any move by Taiwan to declare what is, in fact, the reality of the situation is seen by onlookers as a provocation.

There is a third option, immediate unification, but very few people in Taiwan, less than about three percent in any particular generation. In all of this, the one thing that unites Taiwanese vis-a-vis China is the idea that whichever direction is eventually taken concerning unification or independence, it should be up to Taiwan, not China, to decide.*

The international community doesn't seem to think this is a good idea.

Reprimanding Taiwan for possibly angering China is kind of like punishing the courtier for telling the emperor he's naked, but that's the way it is. The world was badly made, so we have to deal with the realities of the situation, not the way things should be. It's for this that I have tried to focus more on the economic bonds which arguably are the only mechanism that keeps Chinese missiles on the west side of the Strait gathering dust.

The argument that healthy trade promotes lasting peace is as old as, at least, the Enlightenment, when philosophers began positing that increased trade would mean less war because, well, you can't sell iPods to dead people. In that same vein, people have looked at China's rise with guarded optimism. The success of the Chinese of the last several decades is unprecedented, and to make it sweeter Taiwan was tens of billions of dollars invested in China. So, an attack on Taiwan would be detrimental not only to Taiwan but to China itself.

Yet, irregardless, China gives pause yaysayers by actively intensifying its military capabilities, investing heavily in developing and acquiring new technology, coupled with the largest population in the world from which to pool its personnel -- whether it be sales or military.

So, it's a gamble, and the rest of the world is banking a lot on whether or not China's newfound wealth will weaken the authoritarian maestro that works diligently to keep all of the cars on the rails and promises to exact punishment on any bodies who may defy them. As it goes, the wealthier the Chinese get and the larger and better educated the middle class becomes, the more they will question the government that stands so firmly against personal liberty. This belief assumes, based on the experiences of European countries during the Industrial Revolution, that the better educated the Chinese become, the more democratic they will become and, in turn, the weaker the party becomes.

Dr. David Goodman doesn't think so.

Goodman says a parallel is often drawn between China's development since its reform era began 30 years ago and the period of industrialisation in Europe and the US.

At first the new bourgeoisie in the West were a new middle class created by the process of industrialisation. As this process deepened, the modern state became more complex, producing managerial and professional classes, which formed a new middle class that neither owned capital nor controlled the state, but derived income and status from service and management.

The demand for a widening of the franchise and the emergence of liberal democracy during the first half of the 19th century in northern Europe are often seen as necessary results of the emergence of the bourgeoisie, Goodman says.

These trends aren't universal though, so industrialization doesn't necessarily bring with it the promise of a large middle class that is separate from the government. Dr. Goodman suggests that instead of looking to the US and UK for understanding of China's industrialization, one would be better served turning to 19th century Germany, Japan, and Russia because "in those countries, the state played a central role in industrialisation, as opposed to the laissez-faire capitalism of the earlier European experience based on the protection of the individual outside the state."

Goodman says that in China today, "where new entrepreneurs did not already participate formally in the activities of the party-state, particularly at leadership levels, they have now found themselves fully incorporated; and many new entrepreneurs would appear to depend on family networks of influence grounded in the party-state", even extending to small-scale businessmen in the private sector.

Many of these new entrepreneurs have come from the ranks of the professional and managerial middle class. Others, more truly independent, are required to co-operate with the party-state "if they desire to maintain a growth trajectory".

This may mean they are expected to take up a local leadership position, perhaps to surrender some equity to a government body. This is part of what Goodman sees as "a growing imperative for successful business people to join the party".

A common generational pattern is that leading cadres are recruited from the peasantry on intellectual merit, then as they retire their children become business people, "building on the local relationships and networks of influence that their parents have developed". So in China, "ownership, management and control are intertwined in ways that cut across previous analyses of middle (or indeed any other) class behaviour".

And promoting the new entrepreneurs and the new rich as "the new middle classes" fits well the ideological constraint of today's rulers against celebrating conspicuous wealth. All China's classes are increasingly portrayed as middle. It's just that some are decidedly more middle than others.

So, if I understand correctly, China's middle class is more or less absorbed by the party, which in turn means that the only resistance to the party's policies comes from the poor, peasant classes that are not reaping the benefits of the country's growing influence. This all seems to fly in the face of the idea that industrialization will lead to the development of democratic elements in government, since the government is co-opting the very people who would form the free-thinking businessmen, scientists, and educators who otherwise would be its critics.

So, what direction is this taking China? For those who do believe in the opening up of China, where is the proof that it is moving in that direction? I know things have gotten better, comparatively, from previous decades, but is there any proof that it is likely to continue to open up?

Keep in mind, I'm not trying to find a reason to pooh-pooh China. As much as I believe Taiwan merits being recognized for its democratic transformation and the sovereignty the Taiwanese people do, in fact, exercise over their country, I also want peace overall. If that means holding out for unification with a better China, then by all means. But how long will Taiwan be held in limbo?

I ask these questions not only in light of the aforementioned article on Dr. Goodman but also the recent release of the 2008 Freedom House survey on freedom around the world. This report is significant because "results for 2007 marked the second consecutive year in which the survey registered a decline in freedom, representing the first two-year setback in the past 15 years."

Looking closely at the results for China and Taiwan, you see a significant discrepancy between the freedoms people expect in those countries. Political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL) are measured on a scale of one to seven -- a one being the best, and a seven being the worst. While China received a "Not Free" designation with a PR rating of seven and a CL rating of six, Taiwan's PR was two, its CL was a perfect one. Chinese territories like Hong Kong and Tibet were designated as "Partly Free" and "Not Free" respectively. The report says of Tibet:

China intensified its pressure on Tibet, which suffered a further loss of freedom due in part to the acceleration of a government program aimed at forcibly resettling nomadic herders.

Of China itself, the report notes that "about half" of the people living in Not Free countries live in China and that the Chinese government

has emerged as an impediment to the spread of democracy in East Asia and other regions, especially Africa [which I mentioned here]. China has played a particularly negative role in Burma, where it sustains a brutal military dictatorship through economic and diplomatic support, and in North Korea, through its policy of forcibly returning those who flee the Pyongyang regime. In Africa, China provides various kinds of aid, including security assistance, to authoritarian countries and undermines the efforts of the United States, the European Union, and multilateral institutions to promote honest and transparent governance.

Finally, despite those who hypothesized that the upcoming 2008 Olympic Games would be an impetus for "modest democratic reforms" in China


In the title of this post, I asked "How long should we wait for democratic reform in China?" I should clarify that "Taiwan" should not be understood as the antecedent to that "we," though it is included. Correct me if I'm wrong, but we are all waiting on China. We are the investors who hope to tap into a new market only to be subject to strict limitations or waste large sums of money on corrupt officials. We are the ones who recognize that the growing gap between the rich and the poor around the world -- worst of all, though, in China -- is a recipe for disaster. We are the ones who believe in global trade as an instrument of peace, but only if it is fair and transparent. Finally, yes, we are Taiwan, who is made to wait in limbo for a neighbor whose future seems uncertain.


* More on the numbers can be found in the report I talked about here.