NOTE: Bent, definitely one of my favorite Taiwan blogs, has a refreshing response to this post, along with some unnecessary -- albeit, welcomed -- praise for this website.

Yesterday afternoon, I was standing in the bathroom, pruning my mustache, when I heard a deep rumbling on the horizon. Normally, I would have been content at the possibility of a huge thunderstorm. Thunder and lightning never cease to fascinate me, so there’s nothing like the anticipatory rumbling of a coming thunderstorm.

Strangely, though, for the first time, I immediately thought to myself, “Is it thunder ― or something else? That doesn't sound like thunder does it? It's too explosive.”

As many of you know, more and more over the last several months, I’ve been immersed in the events that have shaped Taiwan over the last century and a half. Upon coming to the unsettling conclusion not only that Taiwan is a completely sovereign nation, deserving universal recognition as such, but also that the PRC’s claims over the island are tenuous at best ― being based on discrepancy, ambiguity, and rhetoric ― I’ve started to seriously question the belief I’ve held for so long that China will not attack Taiwan.

 

I didn't say I doubt it now, but that I'm less comforted by the fluffy consolation my belief in markets and networks once gave me.

Up to this point, I've attributed more weight to the theory, ascribed to by economists from Adam Smith to Amartya Sen, that governments involved in trade with each other do not or should not go to war with each other ― this is what the omnipotent Thomas Friedman calls “The Dell Theory of Conflict Prevention.”

It seems to make sense. A country that relies on its business with other nations cannot afford the economic injury it will incur on itself if it is to go to war with another country ― especially if that country is a trading partner.* It’s no surprise that the cauldron of conflict in the world is in the Middle East ― where, aside from oil, there is little being traded.

In The World is Flat, Friedman talks quite a bit about the “Silicon Shield” that keeps Taiwan safe from China . According to Friedman, “ Taiwan has more than $100 billion invested in investments in mainland China today, and Taiwanese experts run many of the cutting-edge Chinese high-tech manufacturing companies.” That’s no small sum, even for China , I would think.

Yet, when you start to pay attention to all the rhetoric coming out of Beijing , it seems much less important to them. The PRC seems so willing to keep Taiwan ― which I don’t ever see happening without the use of military force ― that it will risk losing the billions of Taiwanese investments, squandering what little soft power it has, and ― I should hope ― spoiling relations with countries that have, until now, been willing to turn a blind eye to the seeming disregard they seem to have for the populace within their borders, let alone outside.

 

Then there's the fact that US government doesn't always seem to know what's going on in China.

To make matters worse, personally (or better**, I’m not sure), Fanfan and I have just bought tickets to go to the States for four months from December to April. Not only have I not spent a Christmas with my family for three years, Fanfan has still to meet many of my friends and family. I couldn’t be happier that I’m going home and that she’s coming with me.

What gives me pause is the fact that this spring could be ― I don’t know how to say ― pivotal. China is not only peeved at the fact that Taiwan is still democratic and, thus, holding presidential elections, but there will also likely be a UN Referendum to show that the Taiwanese people themselves support Taiwan ’s insistence on being a part of said world body. This is a double whammy which could merit invocation of the infamous “Anti-Secession Law” that reserves China ’s right to use “non-peaceful” means to subdue Taiwan ― which could mean anything from blockades to actual armed conflict.

I know that China threatens Taiwan like this on a near constant basis, but, as I learn more about the present via studying Taiwan ’s recent history, I feel that this might actually be the straw that broke the camel’s back.

I also fully except the possibility that I'm reading so much more of it, that it just seems more pressing to me because I'm so enveloped by it right now.

For the sake of argument though, indeed “unnamed sources” [previously cited] in the US government have stated that they don’t actually know much about what China is preparing, and they fear that this spring might be more tense than in 1996 when China fired missiles in to the straights as a means of striking fear in the Taiwanese people ― fear, I must reiterate, of democratically electing their representatives, rather than kowtowing to an authoritarian, though internationally recognized, foreign government.

I’ve been running over any number of possibilities in my head. I’ve heard that foreigners entering America are subject to the judgment/impulses of the immigration officer who interviews them upon entering ― which is to say that no matter how much documentation you have, no matter how orderly your papers are, etc., you can be denied entry into the US based on the minute or two you spend talking to the immigrations officer. This is worse for Taiwanese visitors, having the misfortune of being born in a non-country, who are often questioned about every detail of their intentions for entering the Land of the Free. Fanfan is not only a Taiwanese citizen, though, she is also, obviously, a Taiwanese woman, which makes the situation worse, since they may think she is coming to try to marry me and get American citizenship.

More still, assume that tensions do start to escalate in the coming months, the US government could be even more selective of visitors, since they wouldn’t want people coming over to wait out a conflict with the PRC.

Then, finally, imagine we don't have any problems getting home and that China does take some sort of “non-peaceful” means to try to pacify Taiwan . There are all sorts of possibilities like not being able to come back to Taiwan , that something would happen to her family, etc.

I hope I’m overreacting. I don’t like thinking about things like this, but I can’t help it sometimes.

I’m still holding on to the idea that China has way too much to lose ― economically and politically ― if it attacks Taiwan, but I’m less certain that the PRC cares than I used to feel.

That being said, I am still sick with excitement about going home and introducing my lovely girlfriend of nearly three years to all the people I love, and I’m hoping that some of you out there who have dealt with helping Taiwanese friends come to the US for any amount of time or those of you who are Taiwanese and have been to the States have any advice about how best to prepare for the trip, to make sure there is the least hang-ups and uncertainty as is humanly possible. I’ve heard that proving that Fanfan has to come back to Taiwan is the most important part of the whole immigrations process.

*The exception of course is when a powerful country that is integrated into the global supply chain goes to war with one that is much less powerful and almost completely isolated from international trade.

**While this would put us in a horrible position, at least we'd be safe, right?